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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After  the  district  court  dismissed  a  withheld  judgment  against  Matthew  Joseph
Abramowski, he requested the district court seal his case.  At the hearing on the motion to seal,
he also requested the district court expunge his case.  The district court indicated it would grant
the request for expungement if it had the legal authority, but suggested Mr. Abramowski should
file a separate motion to give proper notice to the State.  The district court sealed the records of
the juvenile proceedings in the case, finding Mr. Abramowski had been unable to secure
employment and independent living opportunities.
Mr. Abramowski then filed a motion for expungement under Idaho Court Administrative
Rule 32 (Rule 32), and explained his difficulties with finding a job or housing stemmed from his
criminal history being a matter of public record.  The district court, with a different judge now
presiding over the case, denied the motion for expungement.  Mr. Abramowski filed a motion to
reconsider, and at the hearing on the motion, presented additional information on his inability to
secure employment and independent living opportunities because his criminal history was
available to the public.  The district court denied the motion to reconsider.
Mr. Abramowski appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his requests for expungement.  In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued
Mr. Abramowski did not show the district court abused its discretion in denying his requests for
expungement.  (See Resp. Br., pp.11-22.)  This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain parts
of the State’s arguments.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Abramowski’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Abramowski’s Requests
For Expungement
A. Introduction
Mr.  Abramowski  asserts  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  denied  his
requests for expungement.  The district court, when it denied the initial motion for expungement,
and when it denied the motion for reconsideration, did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.  The district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related to the case would reasonably result—and had already resulted—in economic or financial
loss  or  harm  to  Mr.  Abramowski. See State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 871-72 (2009);
I.C.A.R. 32(i).
B. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  When  It  Denied  Mr.  Abramowski’s  Initial
Motion  For  Expungement,  Because  The  District  Court  Did  Not  Act  Consistently  With
The Applicable Legal Standards
Mr. Abramowski asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his initial
motion for expungement, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.  The district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related  to  the  case  would  reasonably  result,  and  had  already  resulted,  in  economic  or  financial
loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski; namely, his inability to secure employment and independent
living opportunities. See Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871-72; I.C.A.R. 32(i).
The State contends Mr. Abramowski “presented no evidence to support his assertion of
financial loss resulting from the availability of his criminal record . . . .”  (See Resp. Br., pp.16-
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17.)  The State argues that, while the previous judge had found that Mr. Abramowski “had been
unable to secure employment and independent living opportunities as a result of limitations
related to [Mr.] Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder . . . nothing about that finding actually
supported [Mr.] Abramowski’s claim that his inability to obtain employment and housing was a
result of his criminal record being public, rather than a result of his autism-related ‘limitations.’”
(Resp. Br., p.16.)
However, at the hearing on the motion for expungement, Mr. Abramowski had reminded
the district court that the previous judge had already made findings “to support an order of
expungement.”  (See Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.12-15.)  When he ordered the records from the
juvenile proceedings sealed, the previous judge found, “extraordinary circumstances exist which
justify that such records should be confidential.  The extraordinary circumstances consist of
limitations which relate to Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder.  Due to these limitations,
Abramowski has been unable to secure employment and independent living opportunities that
would not have similar effects on a person without such limitations.”  (See R., p.150.)
At the hearing on the motion to seal, the previous judge stated, “[f]or the record, if I felt
that I had legal authority to expunge, I would exercise discretion in this case to grant that.  I think
that Mr. Abramowski has earned some additional consideration from the Court and, for what it’s
worth, I would exercise some discretion with that in mind.”  (See Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.7, Ls.3-9.)
The previous judge thereby suggested that, had the timing been different, he would have granted
the motion for expungement.  In other words, the previous judge would have found
Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy predominated over the interest in public disclosure, and
the dissemination of the materials related to the case would reasonably result in economic or
financial harm to Mr. Abramowski. See I.C.A.R. 32(i).  Thus, the previous judge’s findings on
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the motion to seal actually indicated Mr. Abramowski had already suffered economic or financial
loss or harm because of the dissemination of the materials related to the case.
 The State further argues, “even accepting as true [Mr.] Abramowski’s assertions that his
inability to secure employment and housing was a direct result of his criminal record being
public, such did not compel a finding by the district court that “[Mr.] Abramowski’s interest in
privacy predominated over the interest in public disclosure.”  (See Resp. Br., p.17.)  According
to the State, “[a]lthough [Mr.] Abramowski would have liked the court to have given his
assertions of economic harm more weight, he had failed [to] show that the court abused its
discretion in weighing the competing interests and ultimately concluding the public interest in
disclosure predominated.”  (See Resp. Br., p.18.)  This argument by the State is unremarkable,
and no further reply is necessary.  Thus, Mr. Abramowski would direct the Court’s attention to
pages 11-15 of the Appellant’s Brief.
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Abramowski’s Motion For
Reconsideration,  Because  The  District  Court  Did  Not  Act  Consistently  With  The
Applicable Legal Standards
Mr. Abramowski asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for reconsideration, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards.  In light of the additional evidence presented in support of the motion for
reconsideration, the district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related to the case had resulted in economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski. See
Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871-72; I.C.A.R. 32(i).
The State argues, “the additional evidence [Mr.] Abramowski presented in support of his
motion for reconsideration did not actually support his claim that he had been denied meaningful
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employment and housing due to the availability of his criminal record . . . .”  (See Resp.
Br., p.20.)  The State argues, “[a]lthough the witnesses on his behalf speculated that
[Mr.] Abramowski’s difficulties were due to the fact that his criminal record was available to the
public, neither witness could definitively testify that [Mr.] Abramowski had been denied
employment and housing due to his criminal record.”  (See Resp. Br., p.19.)
As discussed by the State (see Resp. Br., p.20), the letter from the housing organization
stated that the decision to decline Mr. Abramowski’s application for an apartment “was based on
information obtained from previous landlords or references listed on your application for housing
and/or credit bureau report or criminal history reports.”  (R., p.178.)  But Mr. Abramowski’s
mother testified that his only previous landlords were his parents, and she had not provided any
information to support a denial; his references were from his church; and he did not have a credit
history of which she was aware.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.20, Ls.7-18, p.24, L.20 – p.26, L.6.)
Thus, rather than constitute speculation, his mother’s testimony led to the logical conclusion that
Mr. Abramowski’s criminal history report was the only reason the housing organization denied
his apartment application.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.26, Ls.7-9.)
The State additionally argues Mr. Abramowski did not show the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, because the district court “perceived its
decision as discretionary, applied the correct legal standards, and exercised reason in concluding
[Mr.] Abramowski’s privacy interest was outweighed by the interest in public disclosure.”  (See
Resp. Br., p.22.)  This argument by the State is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary.




For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Mr. Abramowski respectfully requests this this Court vacate the district court’s order denying the
motion for expungement, as well as the district court’s order denying the motion for
reconsideration, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2018.
/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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